Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 12
Issue 1 Winter 1979

Article 8

1979

Case Digest
Journal Staff

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the
Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Journal Staff, Case Digest, 12 Vanderbilt Law Review 205 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol12/iss1/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

CASE DIGEST
This Case Digest provides brief analyses of cases that represent
current aspects of transnational law. The digest includes cases that
apply established legal principles to new and different factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories, and references
are given for further research.
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ADMIRALTY

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OBTAINING QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION BY

MARITIME ATTACHMENT

Is NOT LIMITED BY Shaffer v. Heitner

Amoco, after depositing full payment for an oil shipment, alleged a shortage in the amount of oil delivered and brought suit
against an agency and a vessel of the Republic of Algeria to recover
the value of the missing oil and unearned freight. Amoco commenced the suit quasi in rem by attaching the deposited funds pursuant to New York's Rule B(1) of the Supplemental Rules for
Certain Admiralty Maritime Claims. Unaware that the attachment was void because it had not been perfected by seizure of the
res within the New York rule's prescribed 90 day period, the district court entered a default judgment for Amoco. The garnishee
refused to release funds to Amoco because the attachment was
void. Amoco reattached and returned to district court for an extension nunc pro tunc to perfect the original state attachment. The
court granted the order since Amoco could have relied solely on
Rule B(1) attachment, which does not require possession for
perfection, and because Amoco believed Rule B(1) attachment had
been accomplished. Defendants motioned the court to vacate the
default judgment over a year from its entry, contending that the
nunc pro tunc extension was not authorized by New York procedures. Defendants also alleged that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which became effective before the nunc pro tunc order
was entered, prohibits attachment to obtain jurisdiction over foreign states or their agencies, thus barring the nunc pro tunc exten-
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sion of the state attachment and the Rule B(1) attachment. In
addition, defendants contended that Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977), renders Rule B(1) attachment unconstitutional. The
court denied defendants' motion, holding that the nunc pro tunc
extension was valid. Thus, there was jurisdictional lapse within
which the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act could become applicable, and the court declined to apply the Act retroactively. The
court followed Grand Bahama Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Canadian
TransportationAgencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash.
1978), in holding Rule B(1) constitutional because Shaffer did not
apply to maritime attachments. Significance-The court granted
the nunc pro tunc extension because Amoco could have relied
solely on the pre-judgment attachment provisions of Rule B(1).
The court followed GrandBahama in holding Shaffer inapplicable
to Rule B(1) attachment. However, in relying on Rule B(1) the
District Court ignored the part of the GrandBahama decision that
held the Rule B(1) procedure unconstitutional as insufficient to
protect defendants from the mistaken deprivation of their property. Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie NationaleAlgerienne
De Navigation, 459 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
MAXIMUM LIMITS ON DISABILITY BENEFITS ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO
DEATH BENEFITS PAYABLE UNDER THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION AcT

A hydrologist was fatally injured during the course of his employment with a company under contract with the United States
to perform work in South Vietnam. The employment was within
the coverage of the Defense Base Act, which incorporates the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act. Prior to the amendments of the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Act in 1972, both disability and death benefits were subject to the same maximum and minimum limitations. After the
1972 amendments, the Act's section on disability benefits included
a maximum limitation, but the section on death benefits did not.
The employer, its insurance carrier, and petitioner, the Director of
the Department of Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, contended that Congress had intended that the limitation
on disability payments apply to death benefits as well. An administrative decision in favor of respondents, the surviving widow and
son, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that death benefits payable under the Act are
not subject to the maximum limitations placed on disability payments. Consulting the legislative history, the Court found both the
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language of the Act and the legislative history of the 1972 amendments demonstrated that Congress' omission of a maximum limitation on death benefits was intentional. The legislative history
also suggested that the distinction was a rational one since Congress might have retained maximum benefit limitations to discourage fraudulent claims for disability, "a consideration wholly inapplicable to death benefits." Significance-Deathbenefits payable under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act are not subject to the maximum limitations applicable to disability benefits under that Act. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Dept. of Labor v. Rasmussen,
47 U.S.L.W. 4159 (1979).
2.
REFUSAL OF

ALIEN'S RIGHTS

INS DISTRICT DIRECTOR TO GRANT NON-PRIORITY OR

DEFERRED STATUS IS SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS

TEST AS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Plaintiff alien was charged with deportability and requested
non-priority or deferred status which was denied by the INS District Director. Following exhaustion of other remedies, plaintiff
appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that the Director's departure from established patterns in denying the requested status
was arbitrary and capricious and thus subject to the abuse of discretion test. The INS claimed that the Director's authority was
prosecutorial, did not affect substantive rights, and was completely discretionary. Decisions from other circuits supported both
claims. The instant court stated that the Director's authority was
not prosecutorial, did affect substantive rights since granting nonpriority status effectively eliminated the risk of deportation, and
was based upon humanitarian concerns for the possible victim.
The court thus held that the Director's decision was subject to the
arbitrary and capricious test if his actions departed from established norms or were based on an impermissible classification.
Significance-This decision follows the recent judicial trend allowing challenges to the authority of INS District Directors in their
'determination of deferred status. Nicholas v. Immigration and
NaturalizationService, 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979).
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CUSTOMS

UNITED STATES CUSTOMS CUSTODY AND CONTROL Is BROAD AND CON-

TINUES FROM TIME OF ARRIVAL IN PORT UNTIL FORMAL RELEASE OF
MERCHANDISE By CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES

Defendant, a dock foreman, appealed his convictions of willfully
removing merchandise not yet released by the Customs Service
from customs custody and control, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 549.
Defendant contended that he had never removed the goods from
the actual possession of customs authorities. He argued that the
statutory language "unlawfully removes any merchandise.

. .

in

customs custody or control," should be given a restrictive reading.
The trial court instructed the jury that "custody or control" was
to be given a broad, constructive meaning and that the "removal"
element of the crime was properly defined in terms of common law
theft. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, ruling that
application of a broad, constructive custody concept was proper,
and that common law concepts of theft could be used in interpreting the federal statute. The court relied in its decision upon Mungo
v. United States, 423 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1970), which held that
imported goods are in customs custody from the moment of arrival
in port until formal release by Customs Service. The court cited
other statutory language as well, which manifests a general statutory scheme to "broadly protect the collection of customs duties."
Recognition of a concept of constructive custody would help to
further this scheme. Significance-This decision, although it does
not deviate from existing law as set out in Mungo v. United States,
provides needed reinforcement for the doctrine of constructive customs custody, an issue on which there is little direct authority in
the federal courts. United States v. Harold, 588 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir.
1979).
4. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
UNITED STATES PURCHASER OF FOREIGN MANUFACTURED PRODUCT Is
DENIED FOREIGN INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT IF ORDER FOR PRODUCT

WAS MADE DURING

1971 CONGRESSIONAL

SUSPENSION OF INVESTMENT

CREDIT

A United States corporation entered a preliminary agreement
with a foreign manufacturer to produce a boat. The agreement was
made between August 15, 1971 and December 20, 1971, a period
during which Congress suspended the foreign investment tax
credit. The suspending provision, § 48(a)(7), denied investment
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tax credit to foreign goods made pursuant to an order placed after
August 15, 1971. The Tax Court denied the taxpayer an investment credit of $11,800 because it held that preliminary agreements
constituted an order within § 48(a)(7). Citing House Reports on
§ 48(a)(7) and the Treasury Regulation interpreting the section,
the court of appeals held that any directive reasonably designed
to affect acquisition is an order within § 48(a) (7) and therefore the
Tax Court properly denied taxpayer's claimed investment tax
credit. Significance-Thisdecision is the first interpretation of the
word "order" as used in § 48(a)(7), suspending temporarily the
foreign investment tax credit. Maid of the Mist Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 77-4213 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 1979).
5.
A

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

FOREIGN STATE Is NOT IMMUNE FROM A SUIT FOR REAL PROPERTY

TAXES WHEN SERVICE OF PROCESS HAS BEEN MADE ACCORDING TO
ONE OF THE ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT, WHEN THE NATURE OF THE FOREIGN STATE'S
COURSE OF CONDUCT IS COMMERCIAL, AND WHEN A LIEN, OR THE

EQUIVALENT, Is FILED AGAINST THE FOREIGN STATE'S PROPERTY

Plaintiff, County Board of Arlington County, Virginia, brought
suit against defendant, Government of the German Democratic
Republic, for 1977 county real estate taxes on an apartment building owned by defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss on the
grounds that the court had no jurisdiction because, among other
things, there had been no service of process as required under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and because the defendant was
immune from suit on the property under the Act. The district court
denied the motion to dismiss, holding that there had been proper
service of process and that the foreign state should not be granted
immunity from suit as to this piece of real estate. Service of process
had been made by mailing the documents certified as mailed by
the appropriate court clerk and received by the Foreign Minister
of the defendant government, as evidenced by the copy of the
return receipt filed with the court. This method is the third of four
alternatives under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and the
court found it correctly executed and appropriate in this case. The
court denied immunity as to the property on two grounds. First,
the defendant government's conduct regarding the property was
commercial in nature and therefore was excluded from a grant of
immunity under § 1605(a)(2). Second, because the county requested a declaratory judgment that the real property was subject
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to a tax lien on the property, the rights to immovable property
situated in the United States were put in issue, a second exception
to immunity. Significance-The filing of a tax lien on commercial
real estate of a foreign state, or the equivalent thereof, places in
issue the rights in immovable property situated in the United
States, and thus renders the foreign state subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts in a suit regarding that property.
County Bd. of Arlington County v. Gov't. of the German Democratic Republic, No. 78-293-A (E.D. Va., filed Sept. 6, 1978).

